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Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional13
by Randy E. Barnett
In 2010 something happened in this country that has never happened
before: Congress required that every person enter into a contractual
relationship with a private company. I realize that writers make lots of
factual claims that readers are wise to be skeptical about. I can prove,
however, that an economic mandate like this one is unprecedented. If
this mandate had ever happened before, everyone reading this passage
would know all the contracts the federal government requires them to
make, upon pain of a penalty enforced by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). No reader, however, can recite any such mandate and neither
could any reader’s parents or grandparents because this has never been
done before.
It is not as though the federal government never requires American
citizens to do anything. They must register for the military (and serve
if called), submit a tax form, ﬁll out a census form, and serve on a jury.
Additionally, they must join a posse organized by a United States
Marshall. The existence and nature of these very few duties, however,
illuminates the truly extraordinary and objectionable nature of the
individual insurance mandate. Each of these duties is necessary for the
operation of government itself, and each has traditionally been widely
recognized as inherent in being a citizen of the United States.
Consider why in 1918 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
the claim that the military draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment,14
which bars “involuntary servitude.”15 At ﬁrst glance, conscription
surely looks like a form of involuntary servitude. The Supreme Court,
however, said that it could not see how “the exaction by government
from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of

13. These remarks were prepared as testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings held on February 2, 2011 and a hearing held by the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on the Constitution on February 16, 2011. Together with the Cato Institute,
the Author has submitted amicus briefs in support of the challenges to the Affordable Care
Act in Virginia v. Sebelius in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia and in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama in both the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
15. Id.
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contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation . . . can
be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude.”16
Keep that phrase, “supreme and noble duty” of citizenship, in mind.
For this–and nothing less than this–is what is at stake in the ﬁght over
the constitutionality of the individual insurance mandate. Is it part of
the supreme and noble duty of citizenship to do whatever the Congress
deems in its own discretion to be convenient to its regulation of
interstate commerce? If this proposition is upheld, the relationship of
the people to the federal government would fundamentally change: they
would no longer fairly be called “citizens;” instead, they would more
accurately be described as “subjects.”
In Article III,17 the United States Constitution distinguishes between
citizens of the United States and subjects of foreign states.18 What is
the difference? In the United States, sovereignty rests with the
citizenry. The government, including Congress, is not sovereign over the
people but is the servant of the people. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,19 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that “in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains
with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and
acts.”20 If Congress can mandate that citizens do anything that is
convenient to its regulation of the national economy, however, then that
relationship is now reversed, and Congress has the prerogative powers
of King George III.
In essence, the defenders of this health insurance mandate are making
the following claim: because Congress has the power to draft citizens
into the military–a power tantamount to enslaving one to ﬁght and
die–it has the power to make citizens do anything less than this,
including mandating that they send their money to a private company

16. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (emphasis added).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III.
18. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.”), and U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”).
19. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
20. Id. at 370; see also Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 479 (1793) (Jay, J.) (affirming
“this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country,” and
“the people” consists of “fellow citizens and joint sovereigns.”), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 456 (Wilson, J.) (referring to the
people as “a collection of original sovereigns”).
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and do business with it for the rest of their lives. This simply does not
follow. The greater power does not include the lesser.
One way to justify so exceptional a power would be to ﬁnd it in the
Constitution itself. Does the Constitution expressly give Congress a
power to compel citizens to enter into contractual relations with private
companies, or can this power be fairly implied? The answer is no.
True, the Constitution does give Congress the power to impose taxes
on the people to compel them to give their money to the government for
its support.21 Furthermore, it has long been assumed that Congress
can appropriate funds to provide for the common defense and general
welfare by making disbursements to private companies and individuals.
Social Security and Medicare are examples of the exercise of such tax
and spending powers.
Because the Supreme Court is highly deferential to Congress’s use of
its tax power, the primary constraint on the exercise of this power is
political. That is, like the power to declare war or impose a military
draft, legislators will be held politically accountable for their exercise of
the great and dangerous power to tax. For this constraint to operate,
however, at a minimum Congress must expressly invoke its tax power
so it can be held politically accountable.
This is why it is of utmost signiﬁcance that when Congress enacted
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),22 Congress
did not refer to the penalty imposed on those who fail to buy insurance
as a tax.23 Instead, Congress called it a “penalty” to enforce the
insurance mandate.24 Although the penalty was inserted into the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.),25 Congress expressly severed the
penalty from the normal enforcement mechanisms of the tax code.26
The failure to pay the penalty “shall not be subject to any criminal
prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.”27 Furthermore, the
IRS “shall not . . . ﬁle notice of lien with respect to any property of a
taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty imposed by this
section” or impose a “levy on any such property with respect to such
failure.”28 All of these restrictions undermine the claim that, because
the penalty is inserted into the I.R.C., the penalty is a garden-variety tax.

21.
22.
and 42
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 26
U.S.C.).
See id. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 244-45.
See id.
26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9834 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
See I.R.C. § 5000A(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2010).
I.R.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2010).
I.R.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(B)(i), (g)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2010).
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Nor is this merely a matter of form. As Justice Souter explained in a
1996 case, “if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission.”29 By contrast, Justice Souter
described “a tax [as] a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or
property for the purpose of supporting the Government.”30 When
Congress identiﬁed all the revenue-raising provisions of the PPACA for
the vital purpose of scoring the Act’s costs, however, Congress failed to
include any revenues to be collected under the penalty.31
Rather than tax everyone to provide a direct subsidy to private
insurance companies to compensate them for the cost of the new
regulations being imposed upon them, Congress decided to compel the
people to pay insurance companies directly.32 Congress expressly
justiﬁed the mandate, under the Commerce Clause,33 as an exercise of
its regulatory powers.34 If the mandate to buy insurance is unconstitutional because it exceeds the commerce power, then there is nothing for
the penalty to enforce, regardless of whether it is deemed to be a tax.
Thus, the unprecedented assertion of a power to impose economic
mandates on the citizenry must rise or fall on whether the mandate is
within the power of Congress, under the Commerce Clause, “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,”35 or whether, under the
Necessary and Proper Clause,36 the mandate is both “necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” its commerce power.37
The government is not claiming that the individual mandate is
justiﬁed by the original meaning of either the Commerce Clause or the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Instead, the government and most law
professors who support the mandate have rested their arguments
exclusively on the decisions of the Supreme Court.38 So what does
existing Supreme Court doctrine say about the scope of the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause?

29. United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)
(emphases added).
30. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 492 (1906)).
31. See §§ 9000-9023, 124 Stat. at 847-83.
32. See id. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-44.
33. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 243.
35. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Renée M. Landers, ‘Tomorrow’ May Finally Have Arrived–The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: A Necessary First Step Toward Health Care Equity in
the United States, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 65, 76-77 (2010).
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Of course, given that economic mandates have never before been
imposed on the American people by Congress, there cannot possibly be
any Supreme Court case expressly upholding such a power. During the
New Deal, however, the Supreme Court used the Necessary and Proper
Clause to allow Congress to go beyond the regulation of interstate
commerce itself to reach wholly intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.39 In 1995, in United States v. Lopez,40 the
Supreme Court limited the reach of this power to the regulation of
economic, rather than noneconomic, activity.41 Barring Congress from
regulating noneconomic intrastate activity keeps Congress from reaching
activity that has only a remote connection to interstate commerce
without requiring courts to assess what Alexander Hamilton referred to
as “the more or less of necessity or utility” of a measure.42 The existing
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrines, therefore,
allow Congress to go this far and no further.
The individual health insurance mandate, however, is not regulating
any economic activity. The mandate is quite literally regulating
inactivity. Rather than regulating or prohibiting economic activity in
which a citizen voluntarily chooses to engage–such as growing wheat,
operating a hotel or restaurant, or growing marijuana–the mandate is
commanding that a citizen must engage in economic activity. It is as
though the federal government had mandated Roscoe Filburn (of
Wickard v. Filburn43) to grow wheat or Angel Raich (of Gonzales v.
Raich44) to grow marijuana.
The distinction between acting and not acting is pervasive in all areas
of law. Individuals are liable for their actions; however, absent some
preexisting duty, they cannot be penalized for inaction. Thus, in
defending the mandate, the government has been forced to offer a
number of shifting arguments for why–despite appearances–insurance
mandates are actually regulations of activity. The statute itself speaks

39. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) (relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause case
of McCulloch v. Maryland to justify reaching intrastate activities that affect interstate
commerce).
40. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
41. Id. at 567-68; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
42. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a
National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES 95, 98 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967)
(1832).
43. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
44. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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of regulating “decisions” as though a decision is an action.45 Expanding
the meaning of “activity” to include decisions not to act, however, erases
the distinction between acting and not acting. This expansion would
convert all decisions not to sell one’s house or car into economic activity
that could be regulated or mandated if Congress deemed the expansion
convenient to its regulation of interstate commerce.
The government also claims that it is regulating the activity of
obtaining health care, which it says everyone eventually will seek.46
While the government could try to condition the activity of delivering
health care on patients having previously purchased insurance, the
PPACA did not do this.47 The fact that most Americans will seek health
care at some point or another does not convert their failure to obtain
insurance from inactivity to activity and so does not convert the mandate
to buy insurance into a regulation of activity. For this reason, the
government primarily relies not on the claim that decisions are activities
or that Congress is regulating the activity of seeking health care but on
a proposition that has yet to be accepted by a majority of the Supreme
Court: Congress may do anything that it deems to be “necessary to a
broader scheme” of regulating interstate commerce–in this case, the
regulation of the insurance companies under the commerce power.
Yet there is no such existing doctrine. The government’s theory is
based on a concurring opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia in the 2005
medical marijuana case of Gonzales v. Raich48–a lawsuit this Author
brought on behalf of Angel Raich and argued in the Supreme Court.49
Justice Scalia’s theory, in turn, rests on a single sentence of dictum in
Lopez.50
Whenever a majority of the Supreme Court eventually decides to allow
Congress to regulate noneconomic activity because doing so is essential
to a broader regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court will need to limit
this doctrine, to avoid an unlimited power in Congress. If that day
comes, the Supreme Court need only look back to see that every exercise

45. See § 1501(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 243 (“The requirement regulates activity that is
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”).
46. See § 1501(a), 124 Stat. at 242-44.
47. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.
48. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
49. See id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress may regulate even noneconomic local
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce.”).
50. See 514 U.S. at 561 (noting that the Gun Free School Zone Act was “not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated”).
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of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause has
involved the regulation of voluntary activity.51 Barring Congress from
reaching inactivity prevents it from exercising powers that are even
more remote to the regulation of interstate commerce than is the
regulation of noneconomic activity.
Look at what is happening here. Congress exercises its commerce
power to impose mandates on insurance companies and then claims
these insurance mandates will not have their desired effects unless it
can impose mandates on the people, which would be unconstitutional if
imposed on their own. By this reasoning, Congress would now have the
general police power the Supreme Court has always denied it possessed.
All Congress needs to do is adopt a broad regulatory scheme that will
not work the way Congress likes unless Congress can mandate any form
of desired private conduct.
What limiting principle is offered by the government to this new claim
of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause? The government’s only response, to date, is that health care is somehow different
than other types of goods and services. This argument takes a number
of different forms, but most commonly it is claimed that because
everyone will one day need health care and may not be able to afford it
when that day arrives, and because emergency rooms are obligated by
law to provide care regardless of ability to pay, it is necessary to require
that all persons purchase health insurance today to avoid shifting costs
to others.
There are many serious factual problems with this analysis, but even
if we assume it is entirely accurate, the government has not identiﬁed
any constitutional principle to differentiate health care–or health
insurance–from any other activity that Congress may want to mandate
or conscript the American people to perform in the future. Without
more, a factual distinction is not a constitutional principle. If the
Supreme Court upholds the power to impose insurance mandates on the
people, in the future the Supreme Court will never evaluate the next use
of economic mandates to see if that circumstance is similar to or
different from health care.
For nearly two hundred years, the Supreme Court has avoided making
any such factual distinctions in favor of deferring to Congress’s
assessment of the facts. Lacking any limiting constitutional principle,
once the power to conscript Americans to enter into contractual relations
with private companies is accepted, it will be accepted for any circumstances that Congress deems convenient to its regulation of the national

51. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
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economy.
This would fundamentally reverse the relationship of
American citizens to the federal government. Americans would no
longer be citizens in the fullest sense of the word; they would be
subjects.
Thus, whenever defenders of the insurance mandate say “health care
is different,” this question should be asked: “What constitutional
limitation are you proposing for this power?” If their only reply is the
protection of liberty in the Due Process Clause,52 then they have now
avoided the question by changing the subject. They are actually
claiming that the commerce power is limited only by guaranteed
rights–the very same rights that limit the state’s plenary police power.
This answer is like saying, “Well, the First Amendment53 is a limit on
the commerce power.”
Any answer based on due process or liberty is actually a refusal to
provide any limit to Congress’s enumerated powers. Since a state’s
police power is also limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,54 in reality, defenders of the mandate are claiming that
the powers of Congress are just as broad as the police power of the states.
That is, if the only limit on Congress’s power is the same as the limit on
state power, then the two powers have the same scope. This, however,
is a proposition that has always been rejected by the Supreme Court. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Lopez, “We start with ﬁrst principles.
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers.”55 Chief Justice Rehnquist then quoted James Madison: “The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and deﬁned. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indeﬁnite.”56
In addition, law professors know, even if the American people do not,
that under current constitutional doctrine the Due Process Clause is not
construed to be an open-ended protection of liberty. Instead, the
Supreme Court now construes the Due Process Clause to protect only a
very few speciﬁcally deﬁned rights, none of which would apply to the
right to refrain from doing business with private companies.57 Therefore, when defenders of the mandate give this answer, what they are

52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
55. 514 U.S. at 552.
56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008)
(explaining how the Supreme Court avoids recognizing rights as “fundamental” so as to
avoid protecting liberty under the Due Process Clause).
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really saying is that the enumerated powers scheme in Article I of the
Constitution58 provides no constraint whatsoever on the powers of
Congress.
Because this theory of Congress’s implied power would lead to a
general federal police power, it would, in the words of Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,59 not “consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution,” and would therefore be improper.60 In
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health & Human
Services,61 Judge Vinson held that “the individual mandate falls outside
the boundary of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and cannot be
reconciled with a limited government of enumerated powers. By
deﬁnition, it cannot be ‘proper.’ ”62 In other words, because the
rationale offered to justify the mandate would lead to a general federal
police power, such a law cannot be a proper exercise of congressional
power.
This is but one reason why the insurance mandate, however necessary
it might be, is an improper means to the regulation of interstate
commerce. In 1997 the Supreme Court struck down a mandate that
local sheriffs run background checks on purchasers of ﬁrearms as part
of a broader scheme regulating the sale of guns that Congress enacted
using its commerce power.63 In Printz v. United States,64 the Supreme
Court held that this mandate on state executives unconstitutionally
violated the Tenth Amendment65 and the sovereignty of state governments.66
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia rejected the government’s contention that because the background checks were necessary
to the operation of the regulatory scheme they were justiﬁed under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.67 After memorably calling the Necessary
and Proper Clause “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires
congressional action,”68 Justice Scalia concluded, “When a ‘La[w] . . . for
carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of
state sovereignty reﬂected” in the Tenth Amendment and other constitu-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

U.S. CONST. art. I.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
Id. at 421.
No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
Id. at *33.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
Id. at 923.
Id.
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tional provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into
Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of The
Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be
treated as such.’ ”69
Just as commandeering state governments is an unconstitutional
infringement of state sovereignty, commandeering the people violates the
even more fundamental principle of popular sovereignty. After all, the
Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”70
Should the Supreme Court decide that Congress may not commandeer
the people in this way, such a doctrine would only affect one law: the
PPACA. Because Congress has never done anything like this before, the
Supreme Court does not need to strike down any previous mandate.
This makes a challenge to the insurance mandate more likely to succeed.
If the Supreme Court strikes down the individual insurance mandate,
however, the Supreme Court may also have to strike down the mandates
imposed on insurance companies because the PPACA does not include
the normal severability clause that would let the remainder stand if any
part is invalidated. The very reasons why the government argues that
the individual mandate is essential to implement the insurance
regulations are why the mandate is not severable. Judge Vinson ruled
as such in Florida.71
I am now increasingly coming to believe that if the administration
fears that the legal challenge to the mandate might succeed, the
administration will agree to its repeal and replacement before the
constitutional challenge to the mandate reaches the Supreme Court. If
the challenges do reach the Supreme Court during its next term,
however, as now seems likely, I think there may well be ﬁve votes for
the proposition that economic mandates are simply not within the
limited and enumerated powers of Congress. The American people are
not subjects who must perform any action that Congress deems
convenient to its regulation of interstate commerce. They are citizens
whose powers are as much reserved by the “letter and spirit” of the
enumerated powers scheme as are the states. As you watch these
lawsuits develop, you should remember that hanging in the balance is
nothing less than the ultimate sovereignty of the American people.
(continued on next page)

69. Id. at 923–24 (alterations in original).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
71. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *39.

